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ARTICLE 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS  
UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT:  
A PRIMER AND A CRITIQUE 
Valerie Watnick∗
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of scandals involving Enron, Arthur Andersen and 
other corporations, Congress enacted the landmark Corporate and 
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, more famously known as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereinafter the “Act” or “Sarbanes-Oxley”).1  
Sarbanes-Oxley provided for sweeping reforms in the way that publicly 
held corporations account for and make public disclosures under federal 
securities laws.2  President George W. Bush signed the bill into law and 
 ∗  Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York, Baruch College, 
Zicklin School of Business.  This Article is dedicated to my husband. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 
U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley]. 
 2. See id.  Sarbanes-Oxley created a new federal agency, the Public Accounting 
Oversight Board, which altered the way accounting and consulting firms are permitted 
to practice, altered corporate governance practices (by requiring that all public 
companies have independent audit committees) and imposed broader and more severe 
criminal penalties for accounting and securities fraud. Numerous articles and 
commentaries have already been written about Sarbanes-Oxley, but the Author believes 
this to be the first law review Article compiling an extensive history of whistleblower 
decisions under the Act.  See, e.g., Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA’s Model Rules and the 
Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 461 (2003); Gary G. 
Grindler & Jason A. Jones, Please Step Away from the Shredder and the ‘Delete’ Key: 
§§ 802 and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67 (2004); Miriam 
A. Cherry, Whistling the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers and the Implications 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004); 
Robert C. Brighton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Primer for Public Companies, and Their 
Officers and Directors, and Audit Firms, 28 VILL. L. REV. 605 (2004); Samantha 
Ahuja, What Do I Do Now? A Lawyer’s Duty Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 
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touted the Act as a “far-reaching” reform of American business 
practices.3  In attempting to reform American business practices, 
Congress pressed corporate officers, directors, and other employees into 
service, enlisting them as “foot soldiers” in the fight against corporate 
fraud.  Congress did so by requiring those who witness corporate fraud 
to report what they know about it4 and by offering commiserate 
protection from retaliation under the “whistleblower protection” 
provisions contained within Sarbanes-Oxley.5  Yet, despite Sarbanes-
Oxley being touted as a new bulwark against corporate fraud, the courts 
continue to weaken these whistleblower provisions6 and newspapers 
continue to report scandals involving corporate fraud.7  It seems that 
those who might blow the whistle and protect corporate shareholders are 
not coming forward soon enough to prevent corporate fraud8 and 
whistleblower protections have not accomplished their intended purpose.  
The question then is: are the administrative procedures and legal 
standards inherent in Sarbanes-Oxley such that the whistleblower 
protections are more illusory than functional? 
This Article sets out to answer this question, critically examining 
the whistleblower protections afforded employees under Sarbanes-
Oxley.  Part I of the Article considers the statutory language, the 
1263 (2004); Lauren C. Cohen, Note, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege: How Sarbanes-Oxley Misses the Point, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 297 (2004); 
Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, 
the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 875 (2002) (published in the aftermath of the Enron scandal and in the same year 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 3. President George W. Bush, Remarks at Signing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 38 WKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 31, 1283 (Jul. 30, 2002). 
 4. See Sarbanes-Oxley. 
 5. See id.  Congress also requires companies to set up procedures for receiving 
and retaining reports of such fraud.  See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 78j-1 (West Supp. 2003). 
 6. Lynne Bernabei & Jason Zuckerman, Protect the Whistleblower, NAT’L LAW 
J., (Jun. 19, 2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Reni Gertner, Litigation Over Option Backdating Increases, ST. 
LOUIS DAILY RECORD, Sept. 2, 2006. 
 8. Sarbanes-Oxley specifies that whistleblower complaints are supposed to be 
confidential and anonymous, and that companies are supposed to set up procedures for 
the treatment of these complaints.  See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301. Because such procedures 
are not specified in the Act, treatment can mean something insignificant such as filing 
and reviewing.  See Cherry, supra note 2, at 1071-72. 
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legislative history, and the regulations pursuant to the Act.  Part II then 
examines recent decisions by the U.S. Department of Labor in Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower cases (cases under the Act are initially adjudicated 
by the Department of Labor)9 and the overall framework for 
implementation of the law.  The manner in which Sarbanes-Oxley 
relates to state law, particularly the doctrine of at-will employment, is 
discussed in Part III.  Part IV considers the breadth and effectiveness of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections and the existing legal and 
corporate cultural framework.  Finally, Part V proposes suggestions for 
improving current whistleblower protections under Sarbanes-Oxley so 
that they will accomplish their intended legislative purposes. 
This article concludes that rulings on Sarbanes-Oxley complaints, 
and the implementation of existing regulations adopted by the 
Department of Labor to date, are evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower protections are not nearly strong enough to protect 
whistleblowing employees, and to bring about the changes envisioned 
by Congress.10  Rather, the existing legal framework imposes undue 
waiting periods on whistleblowers, and does not compel corporations to 
root out fraud.11  Moreover, in May 2006, the already anemic framework 
suffered another blow in the Second Circuit.12  In Bechtel v. Competitive 
Technologies, the Circuit Court questioned the viability of all-important 
Sarbanes-Oxley provisions that call for immediate reinstatement of a 
whistleblowing employee who establishes “reasonable cause”13 before a 
hearing that his termination was in retaliation for his whistleblowing.14  
This decision, holding the reinstatement remedy under Sarbanes-Oxley 
unenforceable in a federal court, strikes a deadly blow to whistleblowing 
employees and the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions 
 9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (2002). 
 10. See infra notes 54-58, 180-202 and accompanying text. 
 11. Indeed, at least one article, partially written to reassure corporation counsels, 
noted that “the avalanche” of whistleblower claims that some predicted has not come to 
fruition.  See Grotta Glassman, Sarbanes Oxley Whistleblower Protection—Two Years 
Later—What Hath Enron Wrought?, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Feb. 2005 N.E. Ed., p. 
23. 
 12. Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 13. Id. at 472-73; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. 
§ 42121(b) (2000)). 
 14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)).  See also 
Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 472-74. 
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generally.15  What Bechtel makes abundantly clear is that as the Act is 
being implemented, the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions will 
not protect and encourage corporate whistleblowers.16
Normatively, it appears that meaningful changes must occur on 
three levels to protect and encourage whistleblowers to “whistle” early 
on and to thereby prevent corporate fraud: (i) there must be more 
exacting implementation of the existing Sarbanes-Oxley regulations; (ii) 
administrative tribunals and courts must give effect to the intent of the 
statute—to actually protect whistleblowers; and (iii) years after the 
“Enron wake-up call,” public companies must still reform their business 
cultures to encourage the free flow of information and reporting of 
wrongdoing. 
Whistleblower protection is a critical part of both Sarbanes-Oxley 
and fraud prevention.17  Loyal employees with information to report 
about their corporate employer will only come forward readily—to 
protect investors and individual shareholders against corporate fraud—
when they believe that their livelihoods will be protected in an 
immediate and real way.  Only when all employees are watching—and 
no one is afraid to blow the whistle—will the incidence of fraud in 
public corporations drop to an acceptable level. 
 
 
 
 
 15. See Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 473-75; see also infra notes 144-45, 147 and 
accompanying text.  This decision holding the reinstatement remedy potentially 
unenforceable seems to be in line with current judicial thinking.  On May 30, 2006, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a public employee claiming retaliation for 
speaking against an employer decision had not engaged in protected speech sufficient to 
claim retaliation for the communications he had made.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, No. 
04-473 (U.S. May 30, 2006).  While Garcetti was not a Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower 
case, it does not bode well for future whistleblowers that will come before this Court. 
 16. See, e.g., Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 473-74; Bernabei & Zuckerman, supra note 6, at 
1; infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text. 
 17. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21 (daily ed. Jul. 26, 2002); infra notes 54-58 and 
accompanying text. 
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I. THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF  
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
A. Overview 
The whistleblower protections in Sarbanes-Oxley18 provide in 
§ 80619 in pertinent part:20
§ 1514A. Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases. 
(a) Whistleblower Protection For Employees of Publicly Traded 
Companies.  No company with a class of securities registered 
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file reports under section 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78o(d)), or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against 
an employee in the terms and conditions of employment 
because of any lawful act done by the employee— 
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, 
or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any 
conduct which the employee reasonably believes 
constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 
1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to 
fraud against shareholders, when the information or 
assistance is provided to or the investigation is conducted 
by— 
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; 
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of 
Congress; or 
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee 
(or such other person working for the employer who has 
the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct); or 
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise 
assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any 
knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged violation 
 
 18. See Sarbanes-Oxley; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002). 
 20. Sarbanes-Oxley requires publicly traded companies to convene standing audit 
committees composed of independent directors and at least one financial expert.  These 
committees have the power to hire, compensate and fire the corporation’s auditors.  
These committees are also charged with establishing procedures for handling 
whistleblower complaints.  See Sarbanes-Oxley § 301. 
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of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any 
provision of Federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders. 
Sarbanes-Oxley thus provides redress to an employee wronged 
under the Act in that an employee may bring an enforcement action by 
filing a complaint with the Department of Labor within 90 days of the 
alleged wrongful action21 by the employer.22  The employee, if 
successful, is entitled to such relief as is necessary to make him whole, 
including back pay, reinstatement,23 and compensatory damages.24  
While the statute initially provided specifically that any action for relief 
 21. What constitutes “wrongful” action for purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower provisions is discussed below.  See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying 
text. 
 22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).  The Department of Labor has at times broadly 
construed the Act to meet its remedial purpose, allowing in appropriate cases the 
equitable tolling of the 90-day period that a complainant has to file his claim for relief.  
See Lerbs v. Buca di Beppo, Inc., 2003 DOLSOX LEXIS 29, *7-9 (Dec. 30, 2003).  On 
the other hand, the Department of Labor has at times strictly construed Sarbanes-Oxley, 
requiring that the “named person” (the employer) be a “publicly traded company” 
within the meaning of the statute, and disallowing a claim where the respondent 
employer had initially filed a registration statement, but had not later been required to 
file public financial reports pursuant to federal securities laws.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(b); Flake v. New World Pasta Co., 2003 DOLSOX LEXIS 38, *13 (July 7, 
2003) (holding that respondent employer was not a “publicly traded company” within 
Sarbanes-Oxley since it had not filed certain public financial reports).  Likewise, the 
Department of Labor has consistently held that Sarbanes-Oxley will not be retroactively 
applied where the “protected activity” and “adverse employment action” were taken 
prior to the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley.  See Gilmore v. Parametric Tech., 2003 
DOLSOX LEXIS 51, *12-14 (Feb. 6, 2003); Greenwald v. UBS Paine Webber, Inc., 
2003 DOLSOX LEXIS 50, *1 (Apr. 17, 2003).  Sarbanes-Oxley is still relatively new, 
and it remains to be seen how the Department of Labor will treat whistleblowers in the 
long-term.  A definite trend, however, can already be observed in the Department’s 
“defense-leaning tendency.”  See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text. 
 23. At least two distinct courts have held that damages under the Act might include 
“reputational” damages sufficient to make the employee whole.  See Hanna v. W.L.I. 
Communities, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 34 (S.D. Fla. 2004), Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  But see infra notes 144-45, 147 and 
accompanying text.  Reinstatement might include economic reinstatement, or 
reinstatement to the complainant’s actual job depending on the circumstances of the 
case.  See Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,104-08. 
 24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c). 
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would be governed by the burdens of proof previously applicable to the 
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st 
Century (“AIR 21”)25 and initially adopted the rules and procedures 
from AIR 21,26 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in 
December 2004 issued final rules and procedures for the specific 
handling of discrimination complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley.27
B. Procedural Framework for Whistleblower Proceedings 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley 
The rules and procedures detail the handling of a Sarbanes-Oxley 
complaint from inception to hearing and appeal.28  From the outset, the 
statute itself calls for an investigation, a preliminary order of 
reinstatement29 if there is a “reasonable cause” to believe the complaint 
has merit, and a hearing if requested by either party.30
The procedures further provide that a “[c]omplaint will be 
dismissed if it fails to make a prima facie showing that protected 
behavior or conduct was a contributing factor in the unfavorable 
personnel action alleged in the complaint.”31
The initial procedures only require a complainant to raise an 
inference that his protected conduct was a contributing factor in the 
 
 25. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (2000). 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).  The procedures and burden of proof made expressly 
applicable to a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaint originate in 49 U.S.C. 
§ 42121(b). 
 27. Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 
of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 29 C.F.R. § 1980.100 (2004).  Since these procedures and 
the language of Sarbanes-Oxley are similar to those found in AIR 21 (Wendell H. Ford 
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (“AIR 
21”)), the ERA (The Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(D) (“ERA”)), 
and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”) and because cases under 
Sarbanes-Oxley are still limited, cases under AIR 21, STAA, and the ERA are 
discussed in this article where applicable.  See Halloum v. Intel Corp., Case No. 2003-
SOX-0007, at 10 (Mar. 4, 2004) (noting that the implementing regulations for Sarbanes-
Oxley are patterned after the ERA, the STAA, and AIR 21); see also supra notes 25-26 
and accompanying text. 
 28. See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.100. 
 29. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying discussion. 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)). 
 31. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,104, 52,106. 
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employer’s decision.32  If he does this, then an investigation of the claim 
will proceed unless the employer can show by clear and convincing 
evidence that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 
terminating the complainant.33  Since the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative 
procedure was designed to be an expedited proceeding,34 the rules state 
that a Respondent has 20 days from receipt of the complaint to meet 
with OSHA and present evidence in support of its position.35  The 
procedures do not provide for the OSHA investigator to share this 
evidence with the complainant.36  If the OSHA investigator has 
“reasonable cause” to believe that the “named person [the respondent 
employer] has violated the Act and therefore that preliminary relief for 
the complainant is warranted, OSHA again contacts the named person 
with notice of this determination.”37  The rules then require that the 
named person be given ten business days to provide written evidence, 
meet with the investigator and provide legal and factual arguments 
against a preliminary award of relief.38  Again, the procedures do not 
give the complainant a commensurate right to meet with the OSHA 
investigator or to provide written evidence arguing in favor of a 
preliminary award for relief.39
 32. Id.  In typical discrimination cases, an inference of discrimination is shown by 
offering evidence that the employer treated the complainant in a disparate manner.  See 
Adams v. Zucker Ent., Inc., 2005 WL 1397551 (2005). 
 33. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106.  (outlining that once the complaint is filed, the 
Assistant Secretary must notify the Respondent, also known as the “named person”); 
see also 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). 
 34. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,107. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. at 52,106-07. 
 37. Id. at 52,107. 
 38. See id.  This Section of the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations was designed to 
provide due process protection to the Respondent in accord with the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision under the whistleblower provisions of the STAA.  See Brock 
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987).  While this section may also provide 
due process to the complainant who may not be in danger of suffering direct deprivation 
of property at the hands of the government, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 
(1970), this Section certainly tips the balance in favor of the employer by allowing only 
the respondent to submit written evidence and to at least a rudimentary hearing with the 
investigator prior to a preliminary determination.  See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267.  As is 
discussed later in this article, lengthening the procedure will favor the employer in most 
instances. See infra notes 39, 203-08, 269-78 and accompanying text. 
 39. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07.  Prior to their finalization, the “Government 
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Within 60 days of the filing of the complaint, the investigator is to 
make a determination on behalf of the Assistant Secretary that either 
preliminary relief is warranted, or the complaint lacks merit.40  If the 
Assistant Secretary determines that preliminary relief is warranted, he 
may order that the employee be reinstated.41  Either party may file 
objections to the preliminary determination of the Assistant Secretary 
within 30 days of receipt of the investigator’s findings and request a 
hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).42
At the hearing on the objections to the preliminary determination of 
the Assistant Secretary, an employee bringing a Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower claim must ultimately show by a preponderance of the 
evidence43 that: (1) he engaged in protected activity under Sarbanes-
Oxley; (2) that the employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) that 
he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the protected 
activity was likely a contributing factor in the employer’s decision to 
take adverse action.44  Since there is seldom direct evidence of 
Accountability Project” argued that the implementing rules for Sarbanes-Oxley were 
biased in favor of the employer.  See id. at 52,107. 
 40. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,108.  The Assistant Secretary has not made consistently a 
determination within the 60-day deadline.  See infra note 48 and accompanying text; 69 
Fed.Reg. at 52,108. 
 41. The validity and enforceability of an investigator’s order of reinstatement have 
been called into question by the Second Circuit’s May 2006 decision in Bechtel.  See 
Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 472-75; see also infra notes 144-45, 147 and accompanying text. 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A((b)(2) (adopting 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)); 69 Fed. Reg. at 
52,108. 
 43. The United States Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas burden shifting 
analysis closely parallels the AIR 21 test for determining whether a whistleblower 
under Sarbanes-Oxley can initially make out a prima facie case.  See infra notes 59-65 
and accompanying text.  See also Halloum v. Intel Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-7, at 9-
10 (ALJ March 4, 2004), aff’d ARB Case No. 04-068 (ALJ Jan. 31, 2006) (discussing 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (applying a burden shifting 
analysis to discrimination complaints under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)).  
The analysis is instructive on the ultimate question as to whether a complainant can 
prove illegal retaliatory action.  See Halloum, 2003-SOX-7 at 9; infra notes 59 to 65 
and accompanying text. 
 44. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15, at 34 (ALJ 
Jan. 28, 2004) (citing Macktal v. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1993)); Zinn 
v. Univ. of Mo., 1993–ERA–34 (Sec’y Jan. 18, 1996).  Each of the elements of a 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim is discussed in detail in this article.  See infra 
notes 67-124 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination against a whistleblower, whistleblowing employees may 
prove a nexus between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action inferentially.45
After a hearing, the ALJ will issue a decision in the matter and that 
decision will become the final decision of the Secretary of Labor unless 
a timely petition for review is filed with the Administrative Review 
Board (“ARB”).46  Sarbanes-Oxley further provides that if the Secretary 
of Labor has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the initial 
filing by the employee, the employee may bring an appropriate action 
for de novo review and appropriate relief in federal court.47
The catch in all of these carefully crafted procedures is that they are 
not being closely followed.48  Most Sarbanes-Oxley cases are lingering 
 45. See Woodman v. WWOR TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 83 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that 
direct evidence of discrimination is not required in an age discrimination case under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that discrimination can be shown with 
circumstantial evidence); Richards v. Lenmark Int’l Inc., Case No. 2004-SOX-00049, at 
13; Getman v. SW. Sec., Inc., Case No. 2003-SOX-0008 at 15 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2004) 
(seldom direct evidence of intent), rev’d on other grounds, ARB 04-059 (ARB July 29, 
2005); see infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text. 
 46. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,111. 
 47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b); 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,111.  The complainant can bring 
an action in federal court for de novo review of his complaint if there is no showing that 
the Secretary’s failure to issue a final decision is not due to the bad faith of the 
complainant.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).  In Murray v. TXU Corp., the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas held that while failing to comply with procedures in 
the C.F.R. and “not holding the Secretary’s feet to the irons” might delay a decision, 
such falls “far short” of showing that the plaintiff acted in bad faith.  See Murray v. 
TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (N.D. Tex. 2003).  In Murray, the court was 
willing to hear complainant’s case de novo.  See Murray, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 804.  
Additionally, the right to file in federal court is not absolute, even if the complainant 
has acted in good faith.  A federal court may refuse to hear a whistleblower case on a de 
novo basis if it would not be an efficient use of resources to do so.  In other words, if 
the Department of Labor has expanded significant resources on a matter and appears 
close to making a decision, a federal court can exercise its discretionary right to refuse 
to take the matter into its jurisdiction.  Finally, the District Court may take judicial 
notice of the administrative record in a Sarbanes-Oxley proceeding that has been 
removed to its jurisdiction.  See McClendon v. Hewlett-Packard Co., WL 2847224 (D. 
Idaho 2005) (noting administrative proceeding in McClendon v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
2005-SOX-3 (ALJ)). 
 48. See Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S Dep’t of Labor, available at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (cataloguing and digesting cases by 
date).  See, e.g., McIntyre v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., ARB 2003-SOX-23, (ARB Jul. 27, 
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longer then the mandated 180 days.49  While these dispute processes 
overall may not be inordinately long in the context of the U.S. judicial 
and administrative dispute resolution systems, they are too long to 
achieve Congress’s goal of protecting whistleblowing workers and 
preventing corporations from retaliating against them.  Indeed, the 
ordinary employee cannot afford a long period without a paycheck.50  If 
losing his livelihood without appropriate protection is to be the 
consequence of his “whistleblowing,” the employee will simply choose 
not to report what he reasonably perceives as violations of federal 
securities laws.51  If he does report, a prolonged waiting period will in 
turn encourage corporations, who know that there is no reason to expect 
a prompt administrative response to adverse action against 
whistleblowers, to gloss over or cover up their wrongdoing, instead of 
correcting it.  If the legislative thinking behind an expedited proceeding 
was to encourage and protect whistleblowers that find themselves out of 
work, and to compel companies to take their complaints seriously—and 
it surely was52—such planning is not coming to fruition when 
proceedings to correct retaliation against whistleblowers take a year or 
more to resolve.53
C. The Legislative History and Intent of Sarbanes-Oxley 
In a Section-by-Section analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
Senate indeed reported that the purpose of the whistleblower protection 
contained in Section 806 was to provide federal protection to employees 
that report evidence of fraud to supervisors or federal officials.54  The 
 
2005) (Final Decision & Order filed); Willy v. Ameriton Props., Inc., Case No. 2003-
SOX-9  (Jun. 27, 2003) (discussing steps taken in the proceedings); Halloum v. Intel 
Corp., 2003-SOX-7 (ARB Jan. 31, 2006) (Final decision and order approximately three 
years after initial complaint); Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., ARB 2003-SOX-8 (ARB Jul. 
29, 2005) (Final Decision & Order approximately two years after initial complaint). 
 49. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 50. Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1987) (noting that the 
eventual potential recovery of backpay may not be enough incentive to encourage 
reporting of violations). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d at 484-85 (Straub, J., 
dissenting); see also infra notes 54-58, 145-48 and accompanying text. 
 53. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 54. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21; 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A) (2002). 
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protections were intended to ensure that companies take such complaints 
seriously and avoid the temptation to sweep them under the boardroom 
rugs. 
The Senate noted that prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, employees reporting 
fraud had to rely on the “vagaries” of state law for protection.55  The 
Senate further noted that most corporate employers knew exactly what 
they could do within state law to avoid a suit by a whistleblowing 
employee.56  The Senate’s report also states that U.S. laws need to 
encourage and protect those who report fraudulent activity that can 
“damage innocent investors in publicly traded companies.”57  The 
whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley were thus touted as the 
“single most effective measure possible to prevent recurrence of the 
Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation’s financial markets.”58
 
II. WHISTLEBLOWER CASES DECIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
AND FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Introduction 
At a hearing on the merits of a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower 
claim, an administrative law judge will employ a burden shifting 
 
 55. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21.  For example, New York’s whistleblower law 
only protects employees that report an actual violation of a law or regulation and only if 
the violation creates a specific danger to the public health or safety.  See N.Y. LAB. 
LAW 
§ 740 (1984).  Indeed, in New York, an employee who reports corporate fraud has no 
state law protection against retaliation.  See Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 88 N.Y.2d 869, 
871; see also Sandra Mullings, Is There Whistleblower Protection of Private Employees 
in New York?, 69 Feb. N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 37 (1997) (noting that as of 1997, only 16 states 
had whistleblower statutes, only ten of those protected employees when they had a 
reasonable belief that a statute or rule had been violated and that in the other six states, 
whistleblowing employees have to show that they have reported an actual violation of 
state law or regulation). 
 56. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21.  Anecdotally, it has been reported that within 
48 hours of Sherron Watkins of Enron writing her whistleblowing memo to Ken Lay, 
the Chairman of Enron was given a memo that indicated Ms. Watkins could be fired 
and that she was not protected under state law.  See ROBERT PRENTICE, STUDENT GUIDE 
TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 53 (Thomson-West 2005). 
 57. See 148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418-21. 
 58. Id. 
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analysis that is similar to, but not exactly like, the burden shifting 
analysis laid down by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas v. Green.59  In a hearing, the whistleblower must first prove 
each of the elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.60  
If he meets this burden, the employer may still defend by proving with 
clear and convincing evidence that it had a legitimate, non-
discriminatory motive for its personnel action, and it would have taken 
the same action even if complainant had not engaged in the protected 
activity.61  Even if the Respondent meets this burden, the complainant 
can still ultimately prevail at a hearing if he can then show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate 
 59. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); infra notes 60-
65 and accompanying text.  In McDonnell Douglas, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a discrimination plaintiff in a Title VII discrimination case would bear the 
initial burden to prove the elements of his prima facie case by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See id. at 802.  If he were able to meet this burden, the burden would then 
shift to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for its actions.  See Halloum v. 
Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-0007 at 10.  If the employer could succeed in this relatively low 
burden, the employee could then still succeed if he could prove that the employer’s 
reason was a mere pretext.  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807; Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (noting that employer in a 
discrimination case has mere burden to produce, not persuade as to its legitimate 
reasons for acting).  These burdens are different in Sarbanes-Oxley wherein an 
employer is required to prove (rather than articulate or produce under McDonnell 
Douglas) by clear and convincing evidence a legitimate reason for its adverse action 
against an employee.  See Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007 at 10; McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 60. See Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007 at 10.  A Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower claim is heard at trial de novo.  At a hearing, there is no need to decide 
whether the complainant has made out a prima facie case as this finding is related to 
procedural dismissal at the investigative stage of a proceeding.  Id.  The Halloum court 
noted that while the McDonnell Douglas model of analysis was not exactly the same as 
the required analysis under Sarbanes-Oxley, the “McDonnell Douglas model 
nonetheless serves as an analytical tool to help determine the ultimate issue of whether 
Complainant suffered forbidden discrimination.”  Id.; see supra notes 58-59 and 
accompanying text. 
 61. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15 at 37.  The 
courts have recognized that the “clear and convincing evidence” standard is higher than 
a preponderance of the evidence, but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. (citing 
Yule v. Burns Int’l Security Serv., Case No. 1993-ERA-12 (Sec’y May 24, 1995); 
Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007 at 10; see supra note 126, 128-30 (describing the 
clear and convincing evidence standard to be applied in Sarbanes-Oxley cases). 
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reason is not the real reason, but a “pretext” for the discriminatory 
action.62  A complainant can show pretext by showing that the 
Respondent lacks credibility63 or that the protected activity influenced 
the employer to take adverse action against the employee.64  The 
complainant bears the ultimate burden of showing that his protected 
activity contributed to the employer’s decision to take adverse action 
against him.65  Each of the elements of the claim and the defenses are 
discussed below with citations to representative cases.66
B. Protected Activity 
A “whistleblowing” employee67 must first establish that he has 
engaged in “protected activity.”68  Within the remedial nature of the 
statute, “protected activity” is broadly defined to include the reporting of 
information to Congress, any investigative agency of the federal 
government, or a supervisor at the employer itself; that the employee 
reasonably believes relates to federal securities, mail, wire or other 
fraud, a violation of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules 
 
 62. See Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., Case No. 2003-SOX-000008 at 18-19, rev’d on 
other grounds, ARB 04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Halloum, Case No. 2003-SOX-0007 at 10. 
 66. See infra notes 67-147 and accompanying text. 
 67. As a threshold question, a person making a claim under Sarbanes-Oxley must 
generally show that he is an employee of a publicly traded company.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A.  In a landmark decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit has held that a person is not an “employee” of a publicly traded company within 
the Act if he is foreign worker employed by an overseas subsidiary of a publicly traded 
U.S. company.  See Carnero v. Boston Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2006);  
Beck v. Citicorp., Inc., Case No. 2006-SOX-00003 (August 1, 2006) (holding that the 
court lacked jurisdiction where the complainant was employed in Germany when the 
adverse action took place). 
 68. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-15 at 34 (citing 
Macktal v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  In Welch, the ALJ 
issued a recommended decision and order after a hearing, ordering reinstatement.  Id. at 
34.  This order has yet to be enforced.  As of June 9, 2006, however, the Administrative 
Review Board held that the order of reinstatement should not be stayed (as requested by 
the employer) and that reinstatement should proceed, but that it could include economic 
reinstatement.  Id.  It has been more than two years since the ALJ’s decision in Welch 
and complainant still had not had any relief as of June 2006.  Id. 
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or any other fraud against the shareholders.69  The courts and the 
administrative tribunals within the U.S. Department of Labor70 have 
held that it is not necessary that the information reported actually 
amount to a crime,71 but only that the suspect actions have been 
committed and are reasonably believed by the reporting person to be a 
criminal fraud or other violation of federal securities law.72
In Collins v. Beazer, plaintiff brought her case in federal district 
court73 under Sarbanes-Oxley based on her “reasonable belief” that a 
violation of federal securities laws or regulations had occurred.74  
Plaintiff, a director of marketing at a public company, Beazer Homes 
USA, Inc., reported that the division in which she worked: was 
knowingly overpaying and engaging in business with an outside person 
because of a personal relationship between management and the outside 
person; that a manager was overpaying sales agents who were the 
manager’s personal friends; and that “kickbacks” were being paid for 
lumber purchases.75
The court noted that the plaintiff was not required to show an 
“actual violation” of federal securities law, but only that she 
‘‘reasonably believed” that there was a violation of one of the federal 
laws or regulations enumerated in Sarbanes-Oxley.76  The court noted 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
 70. See Barnes v. Raymond James Assocs., Case No. 2004-SOX-58 (ALJ January 
10, 2005) (complainant did not prove her reasonable belief that information reported 
constituted violation of law). 
 71. In Getman, the ARB reversed the ALJ’s holding and held that complainant 
Getman, a financial analyst at Southwest, had not engaged in “protected activity” when 
she publicly refused to change a stock rating.  See Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., ARB Case 
No. 04-059 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2004) (rev’g Case No. 2003-SOX-00008). 
 72. See Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 
2004) (citing Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 992 
F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993)); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
 73. Plaintiff Collins first filed her case with the Department of Labor and then later 
removed her case to the federal district court for the Northern District of Georgia when 
the Secretary did not make a final determination within the required 180 days.  See 
Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1373-74. 
 74. Id. at 1376. 
 75. Id. at 1376-77. 
 76. Id. at 1376 (citing Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d. 474).  “The legislative history of 
Sarbanes-Oxley states that the reasonableness test ‘is intended to impose the normal 
reasonable person standard used and interpreted in a wide variety of legal contexts.’”  
148 Cong. Rec., S. 7418, 7420 (citing Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d 474).  The threshold is 
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further that this standard is intended to encompass all good faith 
reporting by employees,77 and that given the “broad remedial nature” of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to identify the specific 
code section he believes the corporation has violated.78  Thus defendant 
could not win summary judgment simply by asserting that Collins’ 
claims were too vague and did not rise to the level of those proffered by 
Sherron Watkins in the Enron debacle.79
Other cases have similarly noted that an employee can engage in 
“protected activity” under Sarbanes-Oxley by reporting alleged 
securities law violations within the company to a person or body in a 
supervisory role.80  In Richards v. Lexmark International, Inc., the 
tribunal also took an expansive view of reporting activity where 
complainant reported that problems existed with inventory accounting to 
his direct supervisor,81 reasonably believing that such accounting 
problems amounted to violations of federal and state anti-fraud laws.82  
intended to include “all good faith and reasonable reporting of fraud, and there should 
be no presumption that reporting is otherwise, absent specific evidence.”  Id. at 1376.  
See also Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(reasonable belief possible even where plaintiff lacked expertise to be sure of 
accounting irregularities but relied on reports from the Director of Financial 
Accounting). 
 77. Id. at 1376. 
 78. Id. at 1377.  However, in Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., Case No. 2004-SOX-35 at 8-
9, ARB Case No. SOX 04-123 (ARB Sep. 30, 2005), the administrative review board 
found that the complainant, a medical transcriptionist, who had complained about the 
irregular “counting” of her lines for purposes of her pay did not amount to protected 
activity under the relevant whistleblower statute. 
 79. Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1376; see also supra note 76 and accompanying 
text. 
 80. Richards v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 106, *39 (Oct. 1, 
2004).  See also Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1377-78.  The statute protects internal 
reposting as long as reports are made to “a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee.”  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2002).  The Eastern District of New York 
recently denied the respondent company’s motion for summary judgment where the 
employee made the whistle “audible” by connecting the CEO with the financial officer 
who suspected accounting inaccuracies.  Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22042  at 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  But see Fraser v. Fid. Trust Co. Int’l., 417 F. 
Supp. 2d 310 (plaintiff’s whistleblowing attempts barren of any allegations that would 
alert defendants that he believed company was violating federal law related to fraud on 
shareholders). 
 81. Richards, 2004 DOLSOX 106, at *13-14. 
 82. Id. at *38. 
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The administrative law judge rejected respondent Lexmark’s motion for 
summary judgment urging that Richard’s reports of accounting problems 
at Lexmark were not “protected activity” within Sarbanes-Oxley.83
The Richards decision raises interesting and as yet unanswered 
questions under Sarbanes-Oxley about whether an employee must report 
his suspicions to someone other than his immediate supervisor.  For 
example, where an employee innocently reports suspected violations to 
his superior and then his superior turns out to have been involved in the 
fraud, does this involvement change the employee’s status in some way?  
Was he still engaged in good faith reporting?84  Does the fact that an 
employee’s reporting which was done in good faith, but in hindsight 
appears to have gone into the “black hole” of his corrupt immediate 
supervisor,85 affect the application of the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower 
provisions?86  The Author is not aware of any reported cases dealing 
with these types of entirely plausible factual scenarios and Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower protection triggers. 
Finally, while the Collins and Richards courts appeared to take an 
expansive view of reporting activity,87 other more recent cases present a 
troubling judicial view of what is protected reporting under Sarbanes-
Oxley.88  These courts limit the definition of “fraud” under Sarbanes-
Oxley to reporting that raises specific concerns about shareholder fraud 
vis a vis federal law.89  In turn, at least one of these cases limits 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions so that reports about 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at *39. 
 85. See Richards v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2006 DOLSOX 71, at *1; see also Dan W. 
Goldfine, Plan Ahead Before Trouble Walks In, 13 BUS. L. TODAY 27 (2004) 
(discussing situations where either company counsel or management or both may be 
involved in wrongdoing). 
 86. See, e.g., Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1376 
(N.D. Ga. 2004); Richards, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 71 at *14. 
 87. See Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1376; Richards, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 106 at 
*37-38. 
 88. See, e.g., Bishop v. PCS Admin. (USA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37230 *29-32 
(N.D. Ill. 2006); Wengender v. Robert Half Int’l., Inc., 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 32, *28-
34 (Mar. 30, 2006).  Cf. Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., 2006 
DOLSOX LEXIS 59, *35-36 (May 31, 2006). 
 89. See Bishop, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37230 at *29-32; Wengender, 2006 
DOLSOX LEXIS 32 at *29-32.  Cf. Klopfenstein, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 113 at *35-
36. 
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accounting irregularities would not trigger whistleblower protection.90
C. Employer Must be Aware of Employee’s Protected Activity 
The second element of a whistleblower case is that the employer 
must be aware of the employee’s protected activity when it takes 
adverse action against the employee.91  For example, if an employee 
reported to the federal government, unbeknownst to the corporate 
employer, and then the employer acted against the employee, the 
employee could not then claim retaliation under the Act.  Cases have 
held however that constructive or actual knowledge will be sufficient to 
satisfy this element of the claim.92
While simple in theory, the question of who has knowledge when 
they act against an employee sometimes contains intricacies not 
accounted for in the statute or the cases decided to date.  For example, 
does a corporate board of directors have constructive knowledge when it 
terminates a whistleblowing employee?  What about counsel to the 
board or the corporation?  Can they have constructive knowledge of 
whistleblowing activity sufficient to make the respondent liable under 
Sarbanes-Oxley?  In any event, the U.S. Department of Labor has made 
it clear that an employer may not use a “straw-man” to take retaliatory 
action against employees,93 and that “constructive knowledge can be 
attributed to the ultimate decision-makers94 where the complainant’s 
immediate supervisor had actual knowledge of complainant’s protected 
activities.”95
 
 90. See, e.g., Wengender, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 32 at *15. 
 91. See Richards v Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 106, *34, 39 (Oct. 
1, 2004). 
 92. See, e.g., Henrich v. Ecolab, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 83, *21-23 (Nov. 23, 
2004). But see Anderson v. Jaro Transp. Servs., 2005 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 128, 
*13-14 (Nov. 30, 2005) (noting that complainant’s immediate supervisor did not know 
about his protected activity until after she fired him as a basis for the employer’s 
defense even where contractor who hired complainant’s employer, and indirectly 
complainant, knew of protected activity). 
 93. Henrich, at *24-25; Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., 2004 
DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *82-83 (Apr. 30, 2004). 
 94. But see Anderson, at *13 (noting that immediate supervisory company lacked 
knowledge of protected activity, even where company that hired it to do work did know 
of complaint). 
 95. Henrich, at *21-23. 
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In some cases, however, the employer may really not know that the 
employee has filed a complaint outside the company and thus it would 
not be proper to find a basis for retaliatory discrimination.96  Where an 
inference can be drawn that the employer did know that the employee 
had made a report of illegal activity, the Department of Labor has held 
that the employee will have met its burden to prove this element of the 
claim.97
D. Protected Activity a “Contributing Factor” in  
Adverse Employment Action 
Perhaps the most significant and most difficult factor to prove in a 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower case is the “contributing factor,” or the 
causation, element of the claim.98  Administrative law judges in the 
Department of Labor have repeatedly discussed this element of an 
employee’s claim in Sarbanes-Oxley decisions and in other 
whistleblower actions under statutes similar to Sarbanes-Oxley, but have 
not made clear exactly what an employee must do to meet his burden.99  
In reported cases, the tribunals have noted that the law does not 
specifically require an employee to prove that his protected activity was 
a “motivating” or “significant” factor in the decision to take adverse 
action against him:100
 
 96. Peck v. Safe Air Int’l, Inc., ALJ No. 2001-AIR-3, at 10-11 (Jan. 30, 2004), 
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB 
_DECISIONS/AIR/01AIR03C.HTM (finding that two managers ultimately responsible 
for firing of employee did not know about employee’s complaint to the Federal 
Aviation Administration under AIR 21 (49 U.S.C. § 42121)). 
 97. Lederhaus v. Paschen, No. 1991-ERA-13, at 4 (Oct. 26, 1992), available at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISION
S/ERA/91ERA13C.HTM. 
 98. Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that 
employee had to prove that protected activity was a “contributing factor” in employer’s 
adverse decision under the Whistleblower Protection Act for federal employees). 
 99. The ERA, the STAA and AIR are similar to Sarbanes-Oxley in procedures and 
proof.  See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 109-110 and 
accompanying text. 
 100. Marano, 2 F.3d at 1140 (holding that “motivating” or “significant” was 
previously the standard under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act).  See also 
Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *62 (Apr. 
30, 2004). 
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The words a “contributing factor” . . . means any factor which, alone 
or in connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the 
outcome of the decision.  This test is specifically intended to 
overrule existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove 
that his protected conduct was a “significant,” “motivating,” 
“substantial,” or “predominant,” factor in a personnel action in order 
to overturn that action.101
A whistleblower need only show that his protected activity had a 
role in the decision to act adversely toward him.102  For reasons 
discussed below, this element of a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim 
presents particular evidentiary challenges for employees claiming 
retaliatory action under the Act.103
It is thus difficult, at least initially, for an employee to prove by 
direct evidence that his protected activity was a contributing factor in his 
termination.104
The U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law 
Judges has held that where an adverse action closely follows a report 
made by an employee, the “sequence of events” can support an inference 
of causation.105 More broadly, the Department of Labor has held that 
 101. Marano, 2 F.3d at 1140 (interpreting the whistleblower provisions of the 
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(b)(4)(B)(i), 1221(e)(1) (1989)).  The 
court specifically noted that this test specifically overruled existing case law requiring 
the whistleblower to show that his protected conduct was a “significant,’ ‘motivating,’ 
‘substantial,’ or ‘predominant’ factor in a personnel action.”  Id. 
 102. See id. at 1140.  See also Platone, at *81-82. 
 103. See, e.g., Henrich v. Ecolab, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 83, *24-25 (Nov. 23, 
2004) (noting that complainant had not proved that his protected activities were a 
contributing factor in his termination); Robinson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., ARB No. 04-
041, at 9 (Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/ 
DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/AIR/04_041.AIRP.PDF (holding that because six 
months had passed since the complainant had written a letter detailing security 
violations to the Federal Aviation Authority and the adverse action, and because 
complainant had engaged in questionable conduct during that six month period, the 
letter detailing the security violations was not a contributing factor in employer’s 
decision to take adverse action against complainant); Reines v. Venture Bank and 
Venture Financial Group, Case No. 2005-SOX-00112 at 59-60 (ALJ Mar. 13, 2007). 
 104. See Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1573 (11th Cir. 
1997) (noting that in reviewing Secretary’s decision for substantial evidence no direct 
evidence of retaliation was available in ERA whistleblower case). 
 105. Lederhaus v. Paschen, No. 1991-ERA-13, 5 (Oct. 26, 1992), available at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISION
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“temporal proximity between the protected activities and the adverse 
action may be sufficient to establish the inference that the protected 
activity was a motivation for the adverse action.”106  In at least one case, 
temporal proximity has been interpreted to mean a period as long as a 
year between the reporting activities and the adverse action.107  
Moreover, in the period before the protected activity (where the 
complainant is in good standing) and during the protected activity, the 
employer would be best served in defeating a Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower claim by showing the occurrence of some intervening 
performance event that would justify its adverse action against the 
employee and could not possibly be related to the protected activity.108
In one such case, the complainant reported safety violations under 
the STAA,109 a statute similar to Sarbanes-Oxley in procedure and proof, 
S/ERA/91ERA13C.HTM. 
 106. Thomas v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 1989-ERA-00019, 10 (Sept. 17, 1993), 
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ 
ARB_DECISIONS/ERA/89ERA19A.HTM.  The Department of Labor has also held 
close proximity in time of a complainant’s reporting and his discharge does not require 
finding of retaliation where the discharge was credibly “explained by a non-retaliatory 
motive.”  Barnes v. Raymond James & Assocs., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 2, at *33-34 
(Jan. 10, 2005) (complainant discharged where supervisor learned she was leaving to 
work for a competitor). 
 107. Thomas, 1989-ERA-00019, at 10.  See also Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that time between protected 
activity and adverse action is just one factor for a jury to consider). 
 108. Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 71, at *66-71 (Feb. 2, 2004) 
(noting that employer had not indicated that complainant had performance issues until 
after she refused to change stock rating and that respondent’s general dishonesty added 
to determination that her protected activity contributed to decision to terminate), rev’d 
on other grounds, 2005 DOLSOX 18 (Jul. 29, 2005).  But see Bechtel v. Competitive 
Techs., Inc. 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, *108, 111 (Oct. 5, 2005) (finding employee 
bonus prior to termination not enough to show “pretext” even when given with an 
accompanying complimentary note from management).  The administrative court 
explained that its decision in Bechtel not to find that the employer had acted on pretext 
was at least partially based on the fact that the bonus had been given for work on a 
specific project.  Id. at *111-12.  See Sussberg v. K-Mart Holding Corp., 2-05-CV-
70378 at 17 (E.D. MI.) (Nov. 15, 2006) (discussing effect of interviewing clients). 
 109. Anderson v. Jaro Transp. Servs., 2005 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 128, at *1 
(Nov. 30, 2005).  The STAA generally prohibits an employer from taking adverse 
action against an employee who operates a commercial motor vehicle for making a 
safety-related complaint or refusing to operate a vehicle for fear of serious injury. 
49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006). 
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and also governed by the rules of AIR 21.110  The complainant reported 
that a new company rule requiring truck drivers to pick up and deliver 
their loads within six hours created a safety issue under STAA.111  
Complainant told his supervisor that the new six-hour rule would create 
safety issues if he picked up loads in the late evening and was too tired 
to drive six hours.112  After Anderson reported these concerns, he was 
warned twice for being late in delivering loads and for sleeping off the 
road in his truck.113  In December 2002, Anderson’s supervisor 
terminated his employment,114 citing the fact that he had made late 
deliveries, and had been parking his fully loaded trucks off route, 
between the time of Anderson’s safety complaints and his 
termination,.115
Based on these facts, the ARB found that the employer had not 
violated the STAA even though the employee had made safety 
complaints and was fired within six months of making such 
complaints.116  This was so even though the employer’s purported 
legitimate reasons for termination were directly related to the 
employee’s safety concerns: actually constituting the basis for his 
complaints about safety; and even though the adverse action occurred 
within six months of the protected activity.117  In Anderson, the very 
actions that resulted in his termination—pulling off the road to sleep 
and keeping loads longer than the six hours allowed by company rules—
were also the very subject of complainant’s safety reporting.118  Yet, 
these actions, according to the ARB, were sufficient legitimate reasons 
for the employer’s adverse action, and oddly enough, they were enough 
to show that the employee’s reporting of safety concerns had not been 
the causal factor119 in his termination.120  The Anderson case illustrates 
 110. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
 111. Anderson, at *3. 
 112. Id. at *2-3. 
 113. Id. at *3-4. 
 114. Id. at *4. 
 115. Id. at *3-4. 
 116. See id. at *15-16. 
 117. Id. at *8-9 (describing STAA whistleblower provisions generally); see also 
supra notes 25-27. 
 118. See Anderson, at *3-4. 
 119. In Anderson, the Administrative Review Board applied a standard of proof 
slightly different than that which has been applied under Sarbanes-Oxley.  Id. at *10 
(stating that complainant had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
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the extreme uphill battle a complainant must overcome in proving that 
his protected activity ultimately was a contributing factor in the adverse 
employment action against him.121
E. Adverse Employment Action 
The Department of Labor has indicated that any negative 
employment action will satisfy this element of a whistleblower claim “if 
it is reasonably likely to deter employees from making protected 
disclosures.”122  A complainant need not prove termination or 
suspension from the job, or even a reduction in salary or 
responsibilities.123  For example, even being placed on a possible “lay-
off” list has been said to qualify as adverse employment action, even 
where the employee was not ultimately laid off.124
F. The Employer’s Burden to Rebut 
While the employee bears the initial burden of proving the elements 
of his case by a preponderance of the evidence under Sarbanes-Oxley,125 
the employer can still beat back the claim of discrimination by 
 
protected activity was the “reason for the adverse action”).  The ARB effectively held 
that Anderson had to prove that the employee’s reporting was the causal factor in the 
employer’s decision to act adversely toward complainant.  Id. at *15. 
 120. See id. at *15-16. 
 121. In addition to finding that Anderson did not prove a causal link between his 
reporting and his termination, the ARB found that the employer’s reasons for taking 
adverse action were also legitimate—even though they were the same actions that 
related to Anderson’s safety complaints.  Id. at *3-4, 15-16. 
 122. The Office of Administrative Law Judges has held, however, that a company’s 
filing of a lawsuit against an employee is not an “adverse action” under the Act.  
Vodicka v. Dobi Med. Int’l, Inc., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 101, *23-28 (Dec. 23, 2005). 
 123. Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 5, at *14-15 (Jan. 31, 2006).  
See Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(noting that isolation within company and a change in performance evaluations might 
be found to be retaliation). 
 124. Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 87, at *37-38 (Dec. 9, 
2003).  See also Anderson, at *11-12 (discussing “blacklisting” by a supervisor or 
disseminating adverse information that affirmatively prevents a person from finding 
employment as a possible adverse employment action and noting that the lower tribunal 
held such conduct to be an adverse action within the meaning of the STAA). 
 125. See supra notes 29-46, 60, and accompanying text. 
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proffering “clear and convincing evidence” of legitimate motives for its 
adverse actions.126  In such a case, where there exist both legitimate and 
illegitimate motives for the adverse action, the court may engage in what 
has frequently been called a “dual motive analysis.”127  In these cases, if 
the employer can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would 
have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity by the 
employee,128 the burden will shift back to the employee to ultimately 
persuade the trier of fact that the offered reasons are a mere “pretext” for 
the real cause of the adverse action: the protected conduct.129  
Alternatively, the employee can show that his conduct was at least a 
contributing factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse action.130
Cases where the employer offers what it calls “clear and convincing 
evidence” of a legitimate reason for adverse action put the employee in 
an untenable position.131  In most instances an employee bringing a 
 126. See Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1375-76 (N.D. 
Ga. 2004); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 41, at *146-
148, 196 (Jan. 28, 2004) (holding that employer failed to meet its burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that it would have fired Welch even if he had not 
engaged in the protected activity); supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 127. Overall v. Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 1997-ERA-53, at 33 (Apr. 30, 2001), 
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ 
ARB_DECISIONS/ERA/97ERA53D.HTM (holding employer failed to meet the clear 
and convincing evidence standard for being “relieved of liability under the ERA in a 
dual motive case”); Yule v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 1993-ERA-12, 4-5 (May 24, 1995), 
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ 
ARB_DECISIONS/ERA/93ERA12D.HTM (noting that dual motive analysis applied 
where illegitimate motives played part in Burns’ decision). 
 128. Halloum, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 5, *16-17.  See also Thomas v. Ariz. Pub. 
Serv. Co., 1989-ERA-00019, at 10-11 (Sept. 17, 1993) (indicating employer had to 
articulate existence of legitimate reasons for adverse action).  See also Yule, at 6-7. 
 129. Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 934-35 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(deciding case under the Energy Reorganization Act containing whistleblower 
provisions similar to those contained within Sarbanes-Oxley, but requiring the 
employee’s reporting conduct be a “motivating” factor in the respondent’s decision to 
terminate).  See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. 
 130. Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at 
*81-82 (Apr. 30, 2004) (determining that protected activity played a role in the decision 
to terminate complainant). 
 131. Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., Inc., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *101-103 
(Oct. 5, 2005).  Bechtel is a case with a long and tortured history.  In Bechtel, the OSHA 
investigator first found in favor for the employee and ordered preliminary 
reinstatement.  After a hearing, the administrative law judge found that the employer 
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Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim is also an “at will” employee who 
can be fired for just about any reason—at any time—and so most any 
reason offered by the employer can be deemed “legitimate” by the 
tribunal.132  Thus, the level of protection offered to at-will employees by 
state employment law—as to what constitutes proper dismissal—is the 
ultimate determinant of how much protection whistleblowing 
employees133 will actually receive under Sarbanes-Oxley.134
For example, in Bechtel v. Competitive Technologies, Inc., it 
appears that the complainant had been doing at least a reasonably good 
job prior to the time when he engaged in a “protected activity.”135  With 
regard to reporting requirements, complainant “raised issues that he 
believed needed to be disclosed to the SEC” as well as the “need to 
report potential litigation, [and] the need to disclose a change the in 
compensation plan” and the appropriateness of some of Respondent’s 
representations.136  Nonetheless, even after OSHA had ordered that 
complainant Bechtel be reinstated137 and even in the face of recent 
had put forth clear and convincing evidence of a non-discriminatory motivation for the 
termination of complainant Bechtel.  In the meantime, the employee had applied to the 
federal district court for an order requiring the employer to reinstate the employee 
complainant.  The district court ordered such reinstatement and the employer appealed 
the district court decision.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed 
the district court’s decision, issuing a landmark ruling holding that the preliminary order 
of reinstatement remedy referred to in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is most likely not 
enforceable by a federal court.  Bechtel v. Competitive Techs. Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 473-
75 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 132. See Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *108, 111 (stating that at the hearing 
stage of proceedings, awarding a bonus to an employee prior to termination not enough 
to show “pretext” even when given with an accompanying complimentary note from 
management).  The court explained that its decision in Bechtel not to find that the 
employer had acted on pretext was at least partially based on the fact that the bonus had 
been given for work on a specific project.  Id. at *111-12. 
 133. See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633-38 (1992); Murphy v. Am. 
Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300 (1983). 
 134. The level of protection for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowing claimants does not 
appear to date to be very high.  See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text 
regarding state laws. 
 135. Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *10. 
 136. Id. at *99. 
 137. See Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44 at *3.  But see Bechtel v. Competitive 
Techs. Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 472-74 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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positive commendations by the employer,138 the ALJ did not find in 
complainant Bechtel’s favor at a hearing.139  While the ALJ found that 
Bechtel’s reporting activities did contribute to his discharge,140 the 
Respondent was able to put forth “clear and convincing evidence” of a 
reason for discharge wholly unrelated to the protected activity.141  
Because respondent was able to point to financial reasons for 
complainant’s termination—something most any employer might 
legitimately claim—complainant was unable to prove that respondent’s 
legitimate reasons were pretextual.142 This was so even though Mr. 
Bechtel received a bonus, shares of stock, and positive performance 
analysis just prior to his termination.143
In the meantime, Bechtel had already applied to the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut for enforcement of the 
investigator’s preliminary order of reinstatement made before the ALJ 
hearing.144  Ultimately, the Second Circuit determined that because the 
order of reinstatement was not a “final order,” the court lacked 
jurisdiction to enforce it.145
Bechtel illustrates again the extreme difficulty a Sarbanes-Oxley 
complainant has in proving his case at a hearing where he is an 
employee at will, and where any reason for his discharge can be viewed 
as a legitimate one.146  Additionally in Bechtel, the Second Circuit struck 
a mighty blow to the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections in 
refusing to enforce the preliminary reinstatement order,147 further 
discouraging would be whistleblowers from reporting what they know. 
 138. Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44 at *10. 
 139. Id. at *117-118. 
 140. Id. at *100. 
 141. Id. at *107. 
 142. Id. at *108-112. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 2006).  The 
Bechtel case is currently pending before the ARB. 
 145. Id. at 472-74.  The district court had held the order of reinstatement order 
enforceable.  Id. at 473.  The circuit court dissent in Bechtel argued that the majority 
opinion contravenes the clear intent of Congress.  Id. at 484-85 (Straub, J., dissenting) 
(“The language and history of the Act . . . evince a strong [c]ongressional preference for 
reinstatement as a means of encouraging whistleblowing.”). 
 146. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Bechtel, 448 F.3d at 472-74. 
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III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SARBANES-OXLEY AND EXISTING STATE 
LAW: NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS COMPARED 
Although Congress sought to improve protections for 
whistleblowers with Sarbanes-Oxley,148 most employees involved in 
whistleblower proceedings will be “at-will” employees.  It is this state 
law “at-will” underpinning that creates the biggest overall obstacle for 
whistleblowers under Sarbanes-Oxley and the biggest impediment to 
successful implementation of the legislatively stated goal—that of 
encouraging employees to openly report evidence of corporate fraud.149
At its most extreme, the doctrine of at-will employment generally 
provides that an employee with no set period of employment may be 
discharged at any time for any reason except a discriminatory reason.150  
In other words, an employee in a state that is less protective of 
employees may properly be dismissed for “wearing a red shirt.”151  The 
difficulty for the employee thus comes in trying to prove that the real 
reason for the adverse action was discrimination or retaliation, rather 
than “the red shirt”—as even the “red shirt” is generally enough reason 
to fire an at-will employee. 
Sarbanes-Oxley impacts state law by disallowing adverse action 
against an employee where the employee’s protected activity contributed 
to the decision to act adversely.152  In this manner, Sarbanes-Oxley adds 
another illegal reason to the list for firing the at-will employee in all 
state jurisdictions.153  Likewise, the employer would be forced to state 
some other reason for its adverse action, although almost any reason 
could be deemed legitimate by a reviewing tribunal.154  And of course, 
employees in all states continue to benefit from state employment laws 
 148. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633 (1992); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. 
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300 (1983). 
 151. See, e.g., Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 297-98 (dismissing employee’s tort based 
claim for discharge where employer had discharged employee for reporting accounting 
improprieties prior to the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 152. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 153. Of course, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution requires that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act trump state employment at-will doctrine where an employee’s 
actions are so protected.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 154. See, e.g., Anderson v. Jaro Transp. Servs., 2005 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 
128, *15-17 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
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that do not contradict or contravene the intent or language of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.155  Many of these state whistleblower laws are, 
however, narrowly drawn or offer little protection for those blowing the 
whistle on securities fraud.156
In New York, for example, the state whistleblower statute only 
protects employees from retaliation when the employee reports a 
violation that specifically affects the public health.157  Employees are 
otherwise left largely unprotected under the state’s common law,158 
while employers are heavily protected by the common law doctrine of at 
will employment.159  For example, the New York State Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed its longstanding commitment not to imply obligations into 
the employer/employee relationship absent some authority to do so from 
the legislature in Murphy v. American Home Products.160  In Murphy, 
the Court refused to recognize the tort of “abusive discharge” in the 
employee at will relationship161 and refused to even imply an obligation 
of good faith into the relationship.162
Similarly, an employee physician brought a claim in New York 
state court against her employer for wrongful discharge after she refused 
to share other employees’ confidential medical information with the 
employer in Horn v. New York Times.163  The Court refused to find that 
the contract had implied terms where doing so would not further the 
underlying agreement of the parties.164  The court held that the physician 
employee was really engaged in a managerial role, charged with 
 155. See, e.g. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2) (2006) (protecting whistleblowing 
employees in New York State that report violations that create a threat to public health 
or safety).  See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 156. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300-01 (1983). 
 159. See, e.g. Remba v. Fed. Employment and Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 131,134 
(1st Dept. 1989), aff’d, 76 N.Y.2d 801 (1991); Weider v. Scala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633 
(1992) (implying exception to at-will employment contract where implied obligation 
would further employment contract’s underlying terms); Horn v. New York Times, 100 
N.Y.2d 85, 95 (2003) (declining to find exception to at-will employment agreement and 
holding in favor of employer even where employee presented sympathetic facts). 
 160. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300-02. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 304-05. 
 163. Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 95. 
 164. Id. at 94. 
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determining whether employees’ injuries were work-related.165  Any 
medical care that she actually gave, the court reasoned, was ancillary to 
the managerial role she played.166  The court thus held that not 
disclosing patient confidences was not central to her role as an 
employee, and implying the obligation of confidentiality would not be in 
“furtherance” of the employer/employee relationship.167  Absent 
legislative change, the court in Horn refused to imply such an obligation 
into the contract.168  Horn thus illustrates a situation where New York’s 
highest court allowed an employer to legally dismiss the plaintiff, an at-
will employee, even though the employer’s conduct appeared to be 
unethical and the employee appeared to be acting properly.169
In contrast, under New Jersey law, at-will employees receive 
greater protection against adverse actions when they are acting 
specifically to serve the public good.  A New Jersey court noted that 
New Jersey’s whistleblower statute protected an employee who blew the 
whistle about his employer’s use of unlicensed workers in Donofry v.  
Autotote Systems, Inc.170  Other New Jersey courts, however, have noted 
that where an employee acts merely in his own interests and only 
indirectly serves the public good, he will not be protected by New 
Jersey’s whistleblower statue and will be subject to the vagaries and 
lesser protections of New Jersey state common law.171
Similarly under Texas law, for example, the at-will employee gets 
little protection from state law.  In Texas, the at-will relationship can be 
terminated despite the whistleblowing status of the person or persons 
subject to termination.172  One Texas court held that a law firm was not 
 165. Id. at 95. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05 (citing Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 
(1917)). 
 168. See Horn, 100 N.Y.2d at 94. 
 169. Id.; but see Fraser v. Fid. Trust Co. Intl., 417 F. Supp. 2d  310, 324-25 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (allowing breach of contract claim alongside Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower claim where employee manual stated that employees were responsible 
for reporting illegal conduct). 
 170. Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 795 A.2d 260 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(applying the Conscientious Employees’ Projection Act (“CEPA”), N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 34:19-3 (West 1988)). 
 171. Demas v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 712 A.2d 693, 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div.1998); see also Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 828 A.2d 883 (N.J. 2003). 
 172. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. 1998). 
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liable in tort to a lawyer/whistleblower who reported overbilling of the 
firm’s clients in Bohatch v. Butler and Binion.173
In summary, if the corporate whistleblower is not specifically 
protected by a state whistleblower statute, he must rely on state common 
law, which will generally offer little protection, or ultimately on 
Sarbanes-Oxley protection.  The problem thus becomes one of circular 
reasoning, in that Sarbanes-Oxley actually allows an employer to escape 
liability if the employer can show that he discharged the employee for a 
legitimate reason.174  Since almost any reason is a legitimate reason 
under many states laws, the employer can simply urge that the employee 
was fired for reasons other than his reporting and escape liability under 
Sarbanes-Oxley.175
In the final analysis, the only way the Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower can survive an employer’s proof of  legitimate action is if 
he can get the court to engage in a “dual motive” analysis.176  Having 
decided that both discriminatory and the non-discriminatory motives 
played a part in the decision to terminate the whistleblower, the tribunal 
can decide whether the employer would have dismissed the employee if 
not for the whistle blowing activity.  If the tribunal determines that 
absent the whistleblowing activity, the employer would not have acted 
adversely toward the employee, even though the employee also had a 
legitimate reason for action, then the court will rule in favor of the 
employee.177  The problem is that courts and administrative tribunals 
have not routinely engaged in the “dual motive”178 analysis.  The result 
is that the employer simply offers what would otherwise be a legitimate 
reason for its adverse action against the employee, thereby vitiating any 
real Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection.179  It thus appears that the 
convergence of the at-will employment doctrine and the burden set out 
for a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower, leave the whistleblower largely 
 173. Id. at 546-47. 
 174. See Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., Case No. 2005 SOX 33, at 39-40 
(A.L.J. Mar. 29, 2005). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Platone v. Atlantic Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., Case No., 2003 SOX 27, 
at 28 (A.L.J. Apr. 30, 2004). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See, e.g. Bechtel v. Competitive Tech. Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 472-75 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 179. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. 
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unprotected. 
IV. THE BREADTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SARBANES-OXLEY 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS 
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Statistics to Date 
The U.S. Department of Labor’s own statistics bear out this lack of 
protection for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers.180 As of June 2005, the 
Department of Labor had compiled a comprehensive list of statistics on 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases.  As of that month, 492 whistleblower cases had 
been filed under Sarbanes-Oxley and 99 of those cases181 were still 
pending before OSHA in the investigative stage of the proceedings.182  
Of the total number filed, 58 cases had been voluntarily withdrawn 
before OSHA issued any findings.183  Some of these 58 cases have likely 
been filed in federal court, as is allowed pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, if 
more than 180 days had passed before a final decision in the matter.184  
OSHA investigators had completed 393 cases,185 with 289 of those 
dismissed for lack of merit.186  Thus, as of June 2005, OSHA had 
dismissed prior to a hearing almost 82% of the cases that it had decided 
under Sarbanes-Oxley.187
Only 64 of the cases before OSHA were found to have merit.188  Of 
 
 180. Telephone Interview with Nilgen Tolek, Dir. of Office of Investigative 
Assistance, Occupation Safety and Health Admin. (June 13, 2005) [hereinafter Tolek 
Interview] (describing the status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley); Telephone 
Interview with Nilgen Tolek, Dir. of Office of Investigative Assistance, Occupation 
Safety and Health Admin. (June 16, 2005) [hereinafter Tolek Interview II] (describing 
the status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 181. Tolek Interview II, supra note 180 and accompanying text (describing the 
status of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 182. Tolek Interview, supra note 180 and accompanying text (describing the status 
of cases filed under Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 183. Tolek Interview, supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 184. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,117 (part 1980.114). 
 185. Tolek Interview, supra note 180. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. Tolek Interview, supra note 180.  The total cases reported include all those 
filed with OSHA under Sarbanes-Oxley and some of these cases have multiple 
complainants.  Determinations made by OSHA are counted separately for each 
complainant.  Thus there exists a discrepancy between the number of cases filed, and 
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those found to have merit, the parties settled 49 prior to a hearing.189  
These statistics indicate that it is very difficult for a complainant to 
succeed at the initial stage of the Sarbanes-Oxley proceedings, the stage 
in which OSHA makes its initial determination before a hearing.190
Once a complainant requests a hearing before an administrative law 
judge, he fairs even worse.191  The Office of Administrative Law Judges 
reported that, as of April 2005,192 it had docketed 155 total cases under 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and decided 119 cases. 193  As of June 2005, only four 
out of the 119 total whistleblower complainants under Sarbanes-Oxley 
had been successful at a hearing.194  Nineteen of the cases were settled, 
and 24 chose to pursue their claims in federal court,195 where the author 
only knows of a handful of successful plaintiffs who have survived 
motions for summary judgment by the corporate employer196 and one 
those in which OSHA has made a determination.  Id. 
 189. Tolek Interview, supra note 180. 
 190. See id.  For example, Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff Mahoney recently survived an 
employer’s motion for summary judgment in the district court proceeding where his 
case had previously been found to lack merit by OSHA.  Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 at 2, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 191. Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Complaints Docketed Before the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Statistical Overview as of 
April 28, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter OALJ Statistical Overview]. 
 192. According to a senior attorney with the Office of Administrative Law Judges, 
statistics on the number and disposition of future cases and decisions since June 2005 
will not be compiled in the near future.  Telephone Interview with Tod Smith, Senior 
Attorney, Office of Administrative law Judges (January 24,2006) [hereinafter Smith 
Interview I]. 
 193. Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Complaints Docketed Before the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Office of Distractive Law Judges, Statistical Overview as of 
April 28, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter OALJ Statistical Overview].  Of the 
289 cases dismissed by the Secretary before a hearing, the parties only requested that 
the Office of Administrative Law judges take jurisdiction for purposes of a hearing in 
155 of these complaints. 
 194. OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1380-81 (N.D. 
Ga. 2004); Fraser v. Fid. Trust Co. Intl., 417 F. Supp. 2d  310, 322-23, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (holding that complainant’s reporting did not have to rise to level of that reported 
by Sherron Watkins to trigger protection of statute); Romaneck v. Deutsche Asset 
Mgmt., No. C05-2473 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (denying summary judgment where 
complainant raised fact issue concerning causation element of Sarbanes-Oxley claim); 
Mahony v. Keyspan Corp 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); supra note 
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other widely publicized case that had been scheduled for trial, but has 
been reportedly settled as of this writing.197
B. The Appearance of Bias 
The statistics from the pending and past administrative proceedings 
in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases point to a problem.198  A 
complainant has only a small statistical chance of success prior to a 
hearing,199 and if a complainant does request a hearing after a 
determination of his claim by OSHA, it appears that he has an even 
smaller chance of success, as only four of the 119 cases docketed for 
hearing have resulted in a positive outcome for the complainant.200  
There thus appears to be an inherent bias against the complainant at the 
investigative and hearing stages of the proceedings.201  Employees are 
having a difficult time refuting their employer’s defenses in Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower proceedings .202
In addition to the fact that there appears to be an inherent bias 
against employees in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases, there are 
other substantive and procedural problems with the Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower provisions.  These problems are discussed in Parts IV.C 
and IV.D below. 
C. Procedural Problems Inherent in Sarbanes-Oxley  
Whistleblower Proceedings 
1. Timing 
Given that the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative procedure was 
designed to be an expedited proceeding,203 the respondent employer 
theoretically has 20 days from receipt of the complaint to meet with 
 
190. 
 197. Sudeep Reddy, TXU Opts to Settle Whistleblower Suit, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, June 10, 2005.  For more information, see Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp. 
2d 799 (N.D. Tex. 2003). 
 198. OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See Id. 
 202. See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying text. 
 203. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,107. 
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OSHA and present evidence in support of its position.204 If the OSHA 
investigator believes that the respondent employer has violated the Act, 
and that preliminary relief for the complainant is warranted, 205 OSHA 
notifies the employer, who is then supposed to have ten business days to 
respond with legal and factual arguments in support to of its position,206 
arguing against a preliminary award of relief.207
Ideally, these proposed time frames might help level a playing field 
stacked heavily in favor of the employer.  While the employer will often 
have more resources, the one advantage the employee has in a 
whistleblower proceeding, at least initially, is that he is intimately 
familiar with the facts surrounding the adverse action against him.  Such 
familiarity with the facts would be extremely helpful in a fast-paced 
proceeding.  Yet the implementing regulations, laying out these strict 
time guidelines, are not being enforced by the U.S. Department of 
Labor.208  When the Department of Labor grants the parties extra time, 
contrary to the implementing procedures, these extensions most often 
benefit the employer and hurt the employee, who is likely unemployed 
and in dire need of immediate relief. 
2. Access to Information and Witnesses and One-Sided Submissions 
The initial implementing procedures for the investigation also stack 
the odds against the employee because they allow employers to make 
submissions to OSHA to which the employee has no access, and to 
which he does not have the opportunity to respond.209  These 
submissions can be damaging, and in some cases may contain 
inaccuracies that will lead to a decision adverse to the employee.  
Perhaps more importantly, the employer has open access to current 
employee “witnesses,” who have every motivation to support the 
employer and make sworn statements on its behalf at every stage in the 
 
 204. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106. 
 205. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,107. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.  This section is expressly stated to provide due process protection to the 
Respondent in accord with the United States Supreme Court’s decision under another 
whistleblower statute, the STAA.  Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 
(1987). 
 208. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 209. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106. 
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investigative proceeding.  Such statements put current employees in 
good stead and allow current employees to avoid siding with a former 
whistleblowing employee who is now suing their employer. 
3. Is the Administrative Proceeding a Forced Waiting Period? 
Finally, the administrative proceeding before OSHA might be 
considered a forced waiting period for the Sarbanes-Oxley complainant.  
While it is true that the Sarbanes-Oxley complainant can file a complaint 
in Federal Court if the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision 
within 180 days of the filing, many complainants may endure the wait 
and do just this.  Since a multitude of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower 
cases will not be investigated and completed to final decision in 180 
days,210 the complainant is literally required to endure a one-sided 
prolonged administrative proceeding with no real hope of quick 
satisfaction before he may seek redress in federal court.  This aspect of 
Sarbanes-Oxley wastes administrative resources and frustrates vigilant 
good faith litigants—litigants who may now be now out of work and 
without incoming resources.  Indeed, the length of the OSHA 
administrative proceeding may actually force the complaining employee 
to take positions he might otherwise have resisted.211
D. Applying Burden Shifting to Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Cases 
and Issues of Proof: Substantive Problems In Whistleblower Cases 
 
While general discrimination law is not specifically applicable to 
Sarbanes-Oxley cases,212 a complaining party under Sarbanes-Oxley, 
just as in a garden-variety discrimination case, must somehow prove that 
he was treated wrongly.  A Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff must initially prove 
his case at a hearing by a preponderance of the evidence.213  As in past 
types of discrimination cases, this then causes a burden shifting 
analysis.214  Whereas the burden shifting analysis in discrimination cases 
 
 210. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 211. See e.g. Tolek Interview, supra note 180. 
 212. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 213. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (expressly incorporating burdens of proof 
contained in 49 U.S.C. 42121 (b); see supra notes 26-28, 60 and accompanying text. 
 214. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). 
866 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
was originally determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas,215 under Sarbanes-Oxley, the evidentiary framework is 
provided by statute and is slightly less onerous for the employee.216  
Initially, suffice it to say that the Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff must prove 
that he was treated adversely, and that his protected activities 
contributed to the decision to treat him wrongly and must do this by a 
“preponderance of the evidence.”217  The employer must then present 
“clear and convincing evidence” of a legitimate reason for its adverse 
action.218  If the employer succeeds in this proof, the employee must 
ultimately bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the reason proffered by the employer is pretextual.219
1. Issues of Proof 
Past discrimination cases are illustrative, if not for the exact 
application of the complainant’s burden of proof, then for the kinds of 
evidence a complainant may use to show he was treated differently, and 
ultimately, wrongfully.220  In past discrimination cases, the courts have 
noted that a plaintiff may prove discrimination, lacking any direct 
evidence, with circumstantial evidence221 such as proof of disparate 
treatment222 or with proof of a pattern of past discrimination.223  As 
 
 215. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 216. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating standards in 49 U.S.C. 42121 
(b)(2)(A) (“AIR 21”); Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374-
75 (N.D. Ga. 2004).  The framework in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases thus 
requires the complainant to bear the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  If he succeeds, the employer may rebut the presumption of discrimination 
with clear and convincing evidence that its actions were supported by legitimate non-
discriminatory motives.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating standards in 49 
U.S.C. 42121 (b)(2)(A) (“AIR 21”); see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.  The 
difference between the two frameworks is more fully discussed infra note 236. 
 217. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (expressly incorporating standards in AIR 21, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 42121 (b)(2)(A).  Cases under AIR 21 adopt the preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  See supra note 213. 
 218. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b). 
 219. See Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7 at 13/21 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004). 
 220. See e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003); Riley v. Emory 
Univ., 2005 WL 1395045, at *2 (11th Cir. Jun. 14, 2005). 
 221. See e.g., Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 100-101 (acknowledging the utility of 
circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases). 
 222. See e.g., Riley v. Emory Univ., 2005 WL 1395045, at *2 (11th Cir. Jun. 14, 
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these kinds of evidence are often not available to a whistleblowing 
employee—since he may be the first to “blow the whistle”—the ability 
to beat back an employer’s “clear and convincing” evidence of 
legitimate motives is more limited for the “whistleblowing” employee 
under Sarbanes-Oxley.224
Moreover, employers appear ready and able to offer up seemingly 
“legitimate” reasons for their adverse employment actions.225  They are 
able to find some fault of an employee (as one would expect, since we 
are dealing with human subjects) and defeat most whistleblower 
claims.226  In this way, employers appear able to easily defeat Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower claims.227
This is not surprising given that within the confines of many states’ 
common law, almost any seemingly sensible reason for discharge of an 
at-will employee will suffice.228  Although the courts have noted that 
Congress intended an employer to have a difficult time proving that a 
“legitimate” reason existed for an adverse action taken against a 
whistleblowing employee protected by Sarbanes-Oxley and other federal 
whistleblower laws,229 this does not appear to be the case.230
2. Burden Shifting Under Sarbanes-Oxley 
The burden-shifting framework under Sarbanes-Oxley also presents 
difficulties for the whistleblower,231 both because he is an employee at 
 
2005). 
 223. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 224. See infra notes 263-64, 280, 282 and accompanying text. 
 225. See e.g., Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005-SOX-00033, at 39-40 (citing 
financial reasons as basis for complainant’s discharge). 
 226. See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193. 
 227. See id. 
 228. Indeed, employers are often known to successfully claim a bad attitude as a 
reason for discharge.  See, e.g., Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines Holdings, Inc., 2004 
DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *84 (Apr. 30, 2004); Yule v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 1993-ERA-
12, at 6-7 (May 24, 1995), available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ 
WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/ERA/93ERA12D.HTM (noting 
“insubordination” as basis for termination). 
 229. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
 230. See, e.g., Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44 at 
*101-07.  See also OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 191. 
 231. See, e.g., Platone, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69; Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares 
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will, as are most other plaintiffs in discrimination suits, and because he 
is in a unique position.  This is so in that in the vast majority of cases, 
there will have been no past whistleblowing and no history or pattern of 
discrimination to draw on in proving his case.232  Lacking these 
similarly situated persons, and faced with a seemingly legitimate reason 
for adverse action by the employer,233 the “whistleblowing” complainant 
has extreme difficulty ever rebutting the employer’s clear and 
convincing evidence of its legitimate motive for adverse action.234
Moreover, while it is somewhat rare for an employer to be unaware 
of an employee’s status in a Title VII discrimination case,235—it would 
be very difficult, for example, for an employer to claim it did not know 
an employee’s sex or race—it is much more common for an employer in 
a “whistleblowing” situation to claim that it was unaware of the 
employee’s protected status when it acted adversely against him.236
These evidentiary difficulties are borne out in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
cases decided to date.237  While a few complainants have been 
successful in proving their cases at an initial hearing, most have not 
because their employer puts forth evidence of a “legitimate,” non-
discriminatory motive for the adverse action. 238  Employers may be able 
Corp., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 41 (Jan. 28, 2004). 
 232. This stands in contrast to cases determined under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 
(1973) (noting that statistics as to petitioner employer’s past hiring practices conformed 
to a “general pattern” of discrimination). 
 233. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. 
 234. See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 191 (citing statistics on the 
resolution of OSHA cases before and after hearings); Tolek Interview supra note 180. 
 235. Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that 
normally an employer would have reason to know a complaining employee’s age, but 
here the decision to terminate was made by officials at an acquiring company who had 
apparently never met complainant or reviewed her personnel file). 
 236. See Overall v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 1997-ERA-53 at 9 (Apr. 30, 2001), 
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB 
_DECISIONS/ERA/97ERA53D.HTM (noting employer managers alleged they were 
unaware of complainant’s activity when he was laid off).  Cases arising under the ERA 
closely parallel the McDonnell Douglas framework in terms of burdens of proof.  Id. at 
12 (noting that employer had articulated a legitimate reason for its actions). 
 237. See supra notes 180-203 and accompanying text. 
 238. See, e.g., Bechtel v. Competitive Tech., Inc., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at 
*102-104 (Oct. 5, 2005); Taylor v. Wells Fargo, Tex., 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 7, at *35-
38 (Feb. 14, 2005) (holding that respondent prevails despite complainant’s 
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to easily offer what might be seen as “clear and convincing” evidence of 
such reasons, even if in the form of affidavits or testimony of current 
employees.239  In the face of these “witness” statements, from those 
current employees obviously hoping to please and certainly hoping not 
to anger their current employers, the whistleblowing employee has great 
difficulty proving that the stated “legitimate motive” is a pretext for the 
real reason for the termination.240
In one example, a complainant was terminated after she reported 
missing serviceable tags for aircraft parts, a protected report under AIR 
21, and after receiving numerous commendations and raises for her good 
work at the company in Parshley v. America West Airlines.241  The 
employer countered, alleging that she had been selected for termination 
based on performance issues and for cost-cutting purposes.242  The 
employer made these assertions although no performance issues were 
noted in her personnel files prior to her termination, and the employer 
subsequently hired an outside employee to fill Parshley’s place.243  The 
court nonetheless accepted the employer’s testimony as credible244 and 
decided that Parshley could not meet her ultimate burden of proof, even 
where the employer’s hiring of a new outside person belied the 
employer’s stated reason for termination.245
While Parshley illustrates just how the burden-shifting framework 
of Sarbanes-Oxley might present unique problems for the whistleblower 
demonstration that her protected activity was a factor in respondent’s retaliation); 
Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 73, at *47-48 (Mar. 4, 2004) (noting 
that judges may draw inferences of causation of employer’s retaliatory action from the 
facts of the case). 
 239. See, e.g., Bechtel, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 44, at *101-08; Parshley v. Am. W. 
Airlines, No. 2002-AIR-10, at 52-53 (A.L.J. Aug. 5, 2002), available at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ALJ_DECISION
S/AIR/02AIR10B.HTM. 
 240. See, e.g., Taylor, at *35-36 (noting even if retaliation was a factor in adverse 
action against employee, respondent put forth a legitimate non-discriminatory motive 
for its adverse action); Halloum, at *47-55 (noting that although retaliatory action 
inferred ultimate decision for respondent in that respondent proved legitimate motive). 
 241. Parshley, at 53-54. 
 242. Id. at 54. 
 243. Id. at 55. 
 244. Id. at 54-55. 
 245. Id. at 55. 
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under Sarbanes-Oxley246 a small handful of cases that have been decided 
thus far have actually parsed through employer’s explanations and come 
to equitable decisions.247  In these cases, the court has looked closely at 
an employer’s motivations, specifically noting that a “whistleblowing” 
employee may sometimes “touch a nerve”248 with his activities.  
Although there may be no direct evidence of a past discriminatory 
pattern by the employer or direct evidence that an employer took 
adverse action based on the protected activity, the investigating and 
ultimate reporting may have caused the employer to look upon the 
employee with disfavor.249
In Platone, the court held that even though the airline for which 
Platone worked could have legitimately terminated her because she was 
romantically involved with another employee (involvement that was 
prohibited by her employer),250 her reporting nonetheless contributed to 
the decision to fire her.251  The court held that the company had to bear 
the risk that the legal and illegal motives could not be separated.252  Thus 
employing a “dual motive” analysis,253 the administrative law judge 
found that where Platone demonstrated that her reporting activities 
contributed to the decision to take adverse action against her, the 
decision would be in favor of the employee.254  The court noted that it is 
not enough that under the circumstances in retrospect, the employer 
made its decision on legitimate grounds.255  Rather, the employer’s 
 246. Id. at 53-55. 
 247. See, e.g., Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *86-87 
(Apr. 30, 2004); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 41, at 
*184-196 (Jan. 28, 2004) (holding that respondent employer could not present clear and 
convincing evidence of legitimate reason for termination). 
 248. Platone, at *77. 
 249. Id. at *81 (noting that Platone’s supervisors were unhappy that she was 
“looking into the flight loss issue”). 
 250. Id. at *84. 
 251. Platone, at *81-82; see also Asst. Sec’y  of Labor for Occupational Safety and 
Health v. Morin Transp., Inc., Case No. 92-STA-41, at 5 (Oct. 1, 1993), 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISION
S/STA/92STA41B.HTM (discussing dual motive analysis). 
 252. Platone, at *85. 
 253. Id. at *84-86. 
 254. Id. at *87. 
 255. Id. at *85. 
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motivation at the time it made its decision is what must be considered.256  
The Platone court was unwilling to accept the employer’s testimony that 
there was discontent with the complainant, and general performance 
issues without some additional contemporaneous proof, such as that 
which might be found in a personnel file or other periodic reporting 
file.257
E. Practical Difficulties for Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers 
In addition to facing the procedural and substantive difficulties 
inherent in the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative proceeding, the 
whistleblowing complainant also faces unique practical challenges that 
make it difficult for him to meet his burden of proof. 
1. Disgraced and Out of Work 
In a typical whistleblowing situation, the whistleblower has 
reported what he knows to his superior, who may or may not be 
involved in the alleged corporate fraud, or reported the same to the 
board of directors, and is now potentially disgraced and out of work.  It 
is at this juncture—psychologically weakened and potentially publicly 
disgraced—that he must become ready and poised to fight a corporate 
giant.258
2. Inequity in Resources 
As discussed above, Sarbanes-Oxley complainants have enjoyed 
little success.259  This is not a surprise when one considers the vast 
inequity in resources between the employees and the public companies 
involved in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower proceeding.260  Given vast 
resources, it appears that these large employers can easily beat back 
accusations of improper termination based on whistleblowing so that the 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. at *85-86. 
 258. Sarbanes-Oxley by definition only applies to “whistleblowing” in “publicly 
traded” companies, entities that are by nature large corporate entities.  Sarbanes-Oxley 
§ 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)). 
 259. See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
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employee may never have the opportunity to produce enough evidence 
to make it beyond the investigative stage of the proceedings.261  
Alternatively, the employer’s resources allows it to mount an aggressive 
defense at the hearing stage, where it can readily offer what might be 
deemed “clear and convincing evidence” of its legitimate reason for 
adverse action.262
3. Witnesses are not Available or Willing to Testify 
Another difficult and potentially insurmountable obstacle for the 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower is that he is uniquely situated as an 
outsider with information to report vis a vis his former co-workers and 
the corporation.  Indeed, the situation that leads him to have 
“whistleblowing” information in the first place may have put him at 
odds with his colleagues, superiors and the board of directors of the 
corporation.  The damaging information did not likely just come to rest 
on his desk.  A whistleblower may have sought the information out over 
time; he may have been perceived as an uncooperative person;263 or “not 
a team player” as he indirectly or directly disagreed with corporate 
action or inaction in some manner.  His role may be defined by his 
unwillingness to go along, and he is thus described as “uncooperative.”  
Moreover, this may be a game of egg and chicken: which came first, the 
“uncooperative” attitude or the unwillingness to engage in unethical and 
potentially illegal fraudulent behavior?264
Finally, an angry employee, because he does not like a general 
“unethical atmosphere,” may actually find reason to “sniff around,” 
further alienating himself from his co-workers and superiors.  As he 
engages in this hunt for information, he alienates himself further265 from 
those in positions of power and becomes even more intent on finding 
 
 261. See supra notes 32-39, 186-187 and accompanying text. 
 262. But see Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 263. See Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 69, at *75-76 (Apr. 
30, 2004). 
 264. Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 71, at *60, 68 (Feb. 2, 2004) 
(noting the employer did not complain of poor performance until after the analyst 
refused to change a stock rating), rev’d on other grounds, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 18 
(Jul. 29, 2005); see also infra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 265. See, e.g., Platone, at *77 (noting that Platone “did in fact touch a nerve” with 
her investigation). 
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something wrong at the corporation.  Indeed, he may relish the idea of 
“ratting the company out.”  The position of the corporate whistleblower 
is thus different than the classic discrimination case, in that his case of 
retaliatory discrimination may develop over time, and he may actually 
be directly pitted against those persons in power who are engaged in 
wrongdoing.  On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that in many 
classic discrimination claimants, such as those that lay claim under Title 
VII,266 claimants are not initially antagonistic toward those in 
supervisory roles. 
4. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 
Further complicating matters for the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower 
is the fact that he may have signed a mandatory arbitration agreement 
with his employer.  At least one court has held that a Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower claim is subject to mandatory arbitration even though the 
Sarbanes-Oxley proceeding is a statutory discrimination proceeding.267  
One commentator has posited that applying these mandatory arbitration 
agreements to Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiffs weakens employee positions 
because arbitration generally favors employers.268
The above procedural, substantive and practical difficulties make it 
difficult for a corporate whistleblower to succeed.  If employees are 
willingly to witness and report fraud, changes are needed in the 
implementing procedures of Sarbanes-Oxley, the effectuation of those 
procedures, and in the manner in which the employer’s burden of proof 
is met. 
 
 266. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 267. Boss v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003).  The United States Supreme Court has also held that mandatory arbitration 
agreements may apply to compel arbitration in employee discrimination cases.  See 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119-23 (2001).  The Supreme Court 
limited its decision somewhat in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294-98 (2002) (holding that employment discrimination 
claim could proceed in EEOC even where the employee was party to a mandatory 
arbitration agreement).  Overall, it appears that the Supreme Court favors enforcement 
of mandatory arbitration agreements even in the context of an employee’s 
discrimination claims. 
 268. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers 
and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. 
REV. 1029, 1082-83 (2004). 
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS 
A. Adherence to the Regulatory Timelines 
The Department of Labor presently does not closely adhere to the 
timelines provided under Sarbanes-Oxley.269  Given that the Sarbanes-
Oxley administrative procedure was designed to be an expedited 
proceeding,270 OSHA should adhere strictly to the administrative 
timelines contained in the implementing regulations.271  The Respondent 
thus would have a limited twenty days from receipt of the complaint to 
meet with OSHA and present evidence in support to of its position.272 If 
the OSHA investigator then believed that the respondent employer had 
violated the Act, and that preliminary relief for the complainant was 
warranted, 273 the employer would only have another very limited period 
of ten business days to respond and argue against the preliminary award 
of relief.274
If OSHA would adhere to these timelines, it would initially level 
the playing field in that the employee, while most often having fewer 
resources than the corporation, has better knowledge of the facts 
surrounding the adverse action against him.275  Moreover, the indignant 
employee is most likely strongest initially, while the corporate giant has 
been taken by surprise.  In contrast, the corporate respondent will begin 
to investigate once sued, and mount a defense with its vast resources.  
As it does so, the corporate employer will grow stronger and the 
employee, who is now most likely out of work, and growing financially 
and emotionally less strong, will lose morale and the will to fight. 
As the proceedings progress, within 60 days of the filing of the 
complaint, the investigator is supposed to make a determination on 
behalf of the Assistant Secretary that either preliminary relief is 
 
 269. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 
806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 
52,104-05 (Aug. 24, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1980). 
 271. Id. at 52,106-07. 
 272. Id. at 52,107. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See supra notes 269-72, infra note 276 and accompanying text. 
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warranted, or that the complaint lacks merit.276  Again, adhering to this 
schedule would also benefit the employee, who knows the facts 
surrounding his adverse employment action best, and would not allow 
the corporate employee to fully gain the advantage of its vast resources.  
Adhering to this strict time schedule would also allow the employee to 
continue to have income if he were granted relief from the administrator, 
including immediate reinstatement as per the regulations.277  If, on the 
other hand, the expeditious proceeding did not result in a favorable 
outcome for the employee, he could still demand a hearing before the 
Office of Administrative Law Judges.  Finally, expeditiously wrapping 
up the initial investigative stage of proceedings would allow a hearing to 
proceed quickly, also to the general benefit of the employee – and again 
leveling what appears to be a very unequal playing field.278  The 
employee would also benefit from the more expeditious proceeding as 
the employee likely has few witnesses to prepare, since former co-
employees (current employees of the corporation) are not likely to 
testify on his behalf, while the employer has many potential witnesses 
and must develop a more complicated case for hearing. 
B. Make the Employer’s Burden Even More Onerous 
As stated above, the employer can beat back the whistleblower’s 
claim if it can show clear and convincing evidence of a legitimate reason 
for its action against the employee.  This is often easy for it to do given 
the employer’s access to a cadre of potential “witnesses” within its 
current employee ranks.  To redress this inequity, employers could be 
required to present at least some documentary evidence to support its 
 
 276. Preliminary decisions by the Assistant Secretary that are supposed to be made 
by the 60-day deadline are not made readily available.  69 Fed. Reg. at 52,108.  The 
Department of Labor has not, however, consistently made a determination within the 
180-day deadline.  See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, 
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (cataloguing and 
digesting cases by date); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 277. 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,108.  The viability of a preliminary order of reinstatement 
has been called into question by the Bechtel decision.  Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., 
Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 472-75 (2d Cir. 2006); supra notes 144-45, 147 and accompanying 
text. 
 278. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2) (adopting the rules and procedures set forth in 49 
U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)); see also Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination 
Complaints, 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,108. 
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adverse action and to defend an employee’s case of retaliatory action.  I 
am not suggesting a statutory change, as it is clear that Congress has not 
required “direct” evidence in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases, nor 
has it done so in other discrimination cases.279  Rather, I am suggesting a 
normative shift in perception as to what constitutes “clear and 
convincing evidence” in the case of whistleblowing employees under 
Sarbanes-Oxley. 
This shift in perception, requiring more stringent proof from 
employers to meet the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, is 
necessary in that the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower is uniquely situated.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley complainant may have blown the whistle about 
securities fraud and other crimes.  Indeed, he may find that he cannot 
bear the ultimate burden of persuasion because his immediate past 
superior, who might be able to attest to his past good work, is under 
investigation or indictment, and is either unwilling or unable to support 
the former employee.  Moreover, it may be that many of the 
whistleblowing employee’s former colleagues participated in the fraud, 
are witnesses to the fraud, or are facing criminal or other legal charges in 
connection with the alleged fraud. 
Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley complainant may be cut off from all 
contact with his former colleagues, these former colleagues refusing to 
get involved either on the advice of counsel, or for fear of “engaging” 
with a whistleblower.  It will often be difficult for a whistleblower 
complainant to convince any of his former co-workers to talk to him or 
to testify on his behalf for fear of termination280 or criminal reprisals.  In 
at least one case, a whistleblowing employee resorted to the use of an 
affidavit from the CEO of a company with which she had had business 
dealings to refute the testimony of her direct supervisor.281  In many 
instances, however, it will not be possible for a whistleblower to get an 
employee of another company to vouch for him since even the 
“outsider” will fear damaging his own relationships with the respondent 
employer in the process.  Additionally, many lower level personnel 
never have contact with anyone outside the company who would be in a 
position to vouch for their good work.  Yet, these lower level employees 
 279. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003). 
 280. Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 71, at *68-70 (Feb. 2, 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 18 (Jul. 29, 2005). 
 281. Id. at *69 (noting that complainant beat back claims that she was not a 
competent employee with an affidavit of an officer from another company). 
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may be the first to witness corporate fraud in a workplace. 
The potential criminal ramifications involved in a Sarbanes-Oxley 
complaint, the often sweeping investigations that accompany 
whistleblower complaints under Sarbanes-Oxley, and corporate 
employees’ general unwillingness to take the side of a former employee 
whistleblower all make it difficult—if not impossible—for Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblowers to obtain the help of former colleagues.282  
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers, thus by the nature of what they report 
on, find themselves in a unique and particularly isolating position vis a 
vis other employees of the corporation. 
C. Allow Employee-Access to Employer-Submissions  
During the OSHA  Investigation 
An anomaly of the Sarbanes-Oxley procedures allows OSHA to 
keep employer submissions from employees during the investigative 
stage of the OSHA proceedings.283  Given the employees’ stature—out 
of work, potentially disheartened, and without resources—this is a 
critical stage of the proceeding.284  At this stage, OSHA has a remedy 
that was intended to be very powerful: the power to order reinstatement 
of the employee.285  In many cases, the employer may not want the 
employee to return to work and an order of reinstatement would be an 
enormous boon to an employee wishing to settle a dispute with his 
employer.  Yet employers are permitted to submit statements to OSHA 
during this investigative stage that are not given to the complainant.286  
This unfair aspect of the process should be modified to allow access to 
submissions for both parties, as the current system does not further 
efforts to get to the true facts of a dispute.287
 
 282. See OALJ Statistical Overview, supra note 193. 
 283. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07; see also supra notes 34-39 and accompanying 
text. 
 284. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07. 
 285. But see Bechtel v. Competitive Techs., Inc., 448 F.3d 469, 472-75 (2d Cir. 
2006) (questioning the viability of the reinstatement order); supra notes 144-45, 147 
and accompanying text.  See supra note 68 for a discussion of the Welch case and the 
reinstatement order therein. 
 286. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07; supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
 287. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,106-07; supra notes 34-39 and accompanying 
discussion.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has said that an airing of factual 
concerns, however brief, serves due process in the proper context and may avoid 
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D. Corporate Culture 
Corporations must educate employees about corporate compliance 
issues, and make clear to them that they have a new role in corporate 
America as “foot soldiers” in the battle against corporate fraud and 
corporations.288  Public corporations need to do more to make their 
employees aware of anonymous reporting hotlines, and make sure those 
hotlines connect to outside independent persons.289  They must 
encourage employees, even those at non-managerial levels, to raise 
serious questions with their supervisors or, if the situation requires it, 
with the independent board of directors.  Reporting potential violations 
in house—even to executive management—may not be sufficient, where 
executive management may be involved in the fraud.290  The difficulty 
of course is that there may be occasions where a non-managerial 
employee may not even know he has come upon corporate irregularity 
or fraud, let alone whether to report these findings to his boss or a higher 
authority, who may end up being involved.291  The best way to solve this 
problem is to encourage open communication throughout the 
organization, and to have a reporting line directly to the outside board of 
directors or outside counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
When it passed Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress intended to protect 
whistleblowers once they had blown the whistle.  Past cases demonstrate 
that whistleblowers have been largely unsuccessful when challenging 
 
erroneous determinations.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-68 (1970). 
 288. Mechanisms for reporting potential violations should be well publicized.  
Teresa T. Kennedy et al., About That Compliance Thing . . . Creating and Evaluating 
Effective Compliance Programs, 28 (2004) available at http://www.kpmginsights.com/ 
pdf/compliancething.pdf. 
 289. Id. at 40. 
 290. L. Dennis Kozlowski, former chairman and chief executive of Tyco 
International was, for example, indicted and convicted of larceny and conspiracy.  See, 
e.g., Andy Wickstrom, Last Straw, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at C2.  To whom would 
a lower level employee at Tyco have safely reported if he had had evidence of the 
crimes committed at Tyco before the government had such information? 
 291. See Damon Darlin & Miquel Helft, H.P. Before a Skeptical Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at C1 (questioning top executives in possible criminal fraud at 
Hewlett-Packard). 
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their employer’s adverse actions against them.  The implementing 
regulations under the Act need to be followed more closely and courts 
need to carefully scrutinize an employer’s asserted legitimate reasons for 
acting against a whistleblowing employee.  Until these modest but 
effective changes in the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower provisions are made, and corporate culture more widely 
embraces open communication, whistleblowers will not be willing to 
blow the whistle in America.  This is a great loss, as after all, it is those 
who work in the corporations every day that first bear witness to the 
transgressions that so often culminate in massive corporate fraud. 
 
